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Abstract 
International calls have been made for reasoning-and-proving to perme-
ate school mathematics. It is important that efforts to heed this call are 
grounded in an understanding of the opportunities to reason- and-prove 
that already exist, especially in secondary-level geometry where reasoning-
and-proving opportunities are prevalent but not thoroughly studied. This 
analysis of six secondary-level geometry textbooks, like studies of other text-
books, characterizes the justifications given in the exposition and the rea-
soning-and-proving activities expected of students in the exercises. Further-
more, this study considers whether the mathematical statements included 
in the reasoning-and-proving opportunities are general or particular in na-
ture. Findings include the fact that the majority of expository mathematical 
statements were general, whereas reasoning-and-proving exercises tended 
to involve particular mathematical statements. Although reasoning-and-
proving opportunities were relatively numerous, it remained rare for the 
reasoning-and-proving process itself to be an explicit object of reflection. 
Relationships between these findings and the necessity principle of peda-
gogy are discussed.  
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Although the process of reasoning-and-proving is an integral com-
ponent of mathematics (Hanna, 1995, 2000; Hersh, 2009), it has not 
been successfully integrated into students’ school mathematics expe-
riences (Stylianou, Blanton, & Knuth, 2009). In the United States and 
Canada, for example, explicit attention to reasoning-and-proving is 
largely confined to a single geometry course at the secondary level 
(Hanna & de Bruyn, 1999; Herbst, 2002). The situation is similar in 
countries such as Taiwan and Germany (Heinze et al., 2008), although 
the age at which students experience geometry may vary. When one 
construes reasoning-and-proving1 as a multifaceted process of mak-
ing, refining, and justifying mathematical claims, the present isolation 
of reasoning-and-proving to geometry runs contrary to international 
recommendations for reasoning-and-proving to be present through-
out the school mathematics curriculum (e.g., Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technology, 2011; National Council of Teachers of Math-
ematics [NCTM], 2000, 2009). Recently, in the United States, which 
is the context for the present study, the Common Core State Standards 
for Mathematics (National Governors Association & Council of Chief 
State School Officers, 2010) identified the construction of viable ar-
guments and the critiquing of others’ reasoning as a key mathemati-
cal practice that should be developed with students at all levels. Un-
derlying these recommendations are assumptions that link students’ 
reasoning-and-proving experiences to their appreciation of its role 
in mathematics (Lampert, 1990; NCTM, 2000) as well as the develop-
ment of deeper conceptual understanding of mathematical content 
(de Villiers, 1995; Dreyfus, 1999).  
In conjunction with policy documents calling for an expanded role 
of reasoning-and-proving, the international research community has 
also identified reasoning-and-proving as an area of focus (Hanna & 
de Villiers, 2008). In the United States, researchers have begun ex-
amining written curriculum materials to determine the extent and 
1 We join Stylianides (2009) in using the term “reasoning-and-proving” to refer 
broadly to processes of conjecturing and justification that are meant to articu-
late a mathematical statement and convince oneself or others of its truth-value, 
wherein the justification or reasons given are acceptable to a particular class-
room community if not the formal mathematical community. We use the term 
“mathematical proof” or “proof” to mean an explicit and deductive argument 
that would be accepted as valid by mathematicians knowledgeable in the par-
ticular content area.   
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nature of reasoning-and-proving opportunities outside geometry. 
In particular, textbook studies have been conducted for the primary 
grades (Bieda, Drwencke, & Picard, in press), for the middle grades 
(Stylianides, 2009), for secondary integrated textbooks (Davis, 2010), 
and for a variety of secondary algebra and pre-calculus textbooks 
(Thompson, Senk, & Johnson, 2012). Taken together, these studies 
confirm that there is a scarcity of opportunities outside geometry for 
U.S. students to engage in or reflect on reasoning-and-proving. Sim-
ilar results have been found with Canadian and Australian textbooks 
(Hanna & de Bruyn, 1999; Vincent & Stacey, 2008). 
Although written curriculum materials are certainly not the sole 
influence on students’ educational experiences in school mathemat-
ics, they are an important one (Cohen, Raudenbush, & Ball, 2003; 
Grouws, Smith, & Sztajn, 2004), which makes these textbook analy-
ses a key step toward better understanding the current state of rea-
soning-and-proving opportunities and informing efforts to infuse rea-
soning-and-proving throughout the school curriculum. By omitting 
the secondary geometry course from analysis, however, these stud-
ies did not examine reasoning-and-proving where it is most preva-
lent. Moreover, textbook studies that have been situated in geometry 
(e.g., Öner, 2008, 2009) did not focus on reasoning-and-proving gen-
erally but, rather, focused on reasoning-and-proving as it specifically 
related to the use of dynamic geometry software. As the mathemat-
ics education community works to incorporate reasoning-and-prov-
ing throughout the school mathematics curriculum, it is important to 
not only look forward to the domains where reasoning-and-proving 
opportunities might be added but also to look back and reflect care-
fully on the nature of reasoning-and-proving opportunities that al-
ready exist. The present study promotes such reflection by character-
izing the nature and extent of reasoning-and-proving opportunities 
in secondary geometry textbooks. 
Background 
Research on Students’ Reasoning-and-Proving 
For decades, students have had difficulty producing written proofs at 
both the secondary (Bell, 1976; Healy & Hoyles, 2000; Martin & Kelly, 
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1998; Porteous, 1990; Senk, 1985; TIMSS, 1998) and university (Recio 
& Godino, 2001; Weber, 2001) levels. One of the most commonly re-
ported issues is students’ misuse of empirical examples2 in the reason-
ing-and-proving process (Bieda, 2010; Bieda, Holden, & Knuth, 2006; 
Chazan, 1993; Harel & Sowder, 2007). In some studies, when stu-
dents were asked to deduce a result, they instead provided an induc-
tive argument using examples or diagrams that did not adequately 
address the generality of the mathematical claim (Healy & Hoyles, 
2000; Martin & Harel, 1989; Williams, 1980). In other studies, students 
were found to be convinced by empirical evidence that mathemati-
cal results were true (Harel & Sowder, 2007; Sowder & Harel, 1998) 
and unconvinced by deductive forms of reasoning (Fischbein, 1982; 
Fujita, Jones, & Kunimune, 2009; Healy & Hoyles, 2000), in the latter 
case often failing to recognize that no further verifications were re-
quired once a correct deductive argument had been given. This con-
stitutes a troubling reversal of logic as many students believe that a 
handful of confirming examples can establish the general truth of a 
mathematical result, whereas a deductive proof only establishes the 
truth of a single case, namely, “the case that is pictured in the associ-
ated diagram” (Chazan, 1993, p. 362). 
Findings related to these two difficulties—struggling to produce 
proofs and misusing inductive arguments—are potentially linked in 
that, when asked to write a proof, students may be unable to do so 
at the moment and thus revert to an inductive argument rather than 
provide no response. Therefore, an inductive response does not neces-
sarily imply that the student viewed it as a valid mathematical proof. 
Some studies, however, have taken up directly the question of stu-
dents’ conceptions of the nature of reasoning-and-proving. For exam-
ple, Herbst and Brach (2006) interviewed geometry students (14–15 
years old) who reported that the purpose of reasoning-and-proving 
was to allow them to demonstrate their reasoning and communication 
2 We note that the empirical problem being described here has to do with the in-
appropriate use of inductive arguments to “prove” a general statement that re-
quires a deductive justification. For example, it would be inappropriate to use 1 
+ 3 = 4 and 3 + 5 = 8 to “prove” that the sum of any two odd numbers is even. We 
do not mean to imply that there is no role for empirical reasoning in the reason-
ing-and-proving process. In fact, we agree with Polya (1959, 1981) that empiri-
cal reasoning is central to the formulation of conjectures and with Lakatos (1976) 
that empirical reasoning is central to the refinement of definitions and theorems. 
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skills, rather than to verify claims or develop mathematical under-
standing. These results were confirmed by Soucy McCrone and Mar-
tin (2009) who also interviewed and observed geometry students, 
finding that they viewed the purpose of proof to be the application 
of recently learned theorems—not a mathematical process for estab-
lishing the truth of theorems. Elsewhere, geometry students were 
found to view deductive argumentation as an arbitrary exercise in 
logic that merely confirms what is already known to be true (Schoen-
feld, 1988; Tinto, 1988).  
These findings highlight the potential danger of students viewing 
reasoning-and-proving as an unnecessary or arbitrary exercise im-
posed on them by a teacher or textbook. Such conceptions of math-
ematical activities have been shown to be detrimental to students’ 
subsequent learning of mathematics (Muis, 2004). Furthermore, it is 
noteworthy that much of this research was conducted with students 
in or beyond secondary geometry (e.g., Chazan, 1993; Herbst & 
Brach, 2006; Selden & Selden, 2003; Soucy McCrone & Martin, 2009). 
In other words, the relatively extensive reasoning-and-proving ex-
periences that students have in geometry do not seem to alleviate 
the known difficulties—in fact, it is possible that some problematic 
conceptions of reasoning-and-proving are specifically related to ex-
periences in geometry. 
Theoretical Perspective 
The research described previously suggests that students’ difficulties 
with reasoning-and-proving are not likely to be alleviated through 
mere exposure to deductive reasoning opportunities or various rea-
soning-and-proving activities (e.g., conjecturing, finding counterex-
amples). Instead, we must carefully consider the nature of the ex-
posure and the mathematical context of the reasoning-and-proving 
activities. This study, therefore, focuses on students’ “opportunities to 
learn” (Floden, 2002; Husen, 1967) to reason-and-prove that are em-
bedded in the textbooks they use. We recognize that curriculum ma-
terials represent only one component of these opportunities to learn 
and that teachers have a more central role in shaping students’ expe-
riences through enactment (Tarr, Chavez, Reys, & Reys, 2006). Never-
theless, curriculum materials have been studied in relation to student 
learning (Shield & Dole, 2013), are a direct source of student tasks 
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and homework assignments, and communicate to students in various 
ways (Herbel-Eisenman, 2007). Curriculum materials also shape what 
teachers do in the classroom (Grouws et al., 2004; McCrory, Francis, 
& Young, 2008), thereby indirectly influencing student learning (Co-
hen et al., 2003; Ni & Cai, 2011). Taken together, this suggests that it 
is reasonable to assume textbooks play an integral part in students’ 
experiences with reasoning-and-proving. 
Examinations of the reasoning-and-proving opportunities in text-
books can be aided and informed by the necessity principle. Harel and 
Tall (1991) identified the necessity principle as a standard for peda-
gogy that involves presenting subject matter in a way that encour-
ages learners to see its intellectual necessity, “[f]or if students do not 
see the rationale for an idea, the idea would seem to them as being 
evoked arbitrarily; it does not become a concept of the students” (p. 
41, emphasis in original). The necessity principle, then, is based on 
the notion that it is beneficial for students to engage with the intellec-
tual underpinnings of a topic rather than as outsiders to the topic. In 
drawing on the necessity principle for a textbook analysis, we recog-
nize not only the textbook’s influence on classroom teaching, but also 
the direct pedagogical relationship between the text and the student. 
Furthermore, textbooks are often based on design principles (Hirsch, 
2007) that are reflected in the embedded opportunities to learn, and 
the necessity principle can be used as a lens for interpreting those op-
portunities, even though teachers do not necessarily enact written ma-
terials as designed (Stein, Remillard, & Smith, 2007). 
There are several studies that suggest the necessity principle is of-
ten not being met with respect to reasoning-and-proving. First, Tinto’s 
(1988) finding that geometry students viewed reasoning-and-prov-
ing as an arbitrary exercise imposed on them by an outside authority, 
such as a teacher or textbook, may be evidence that they did not see 
the intellectual need for deductive forms of reasoning. Second, many 
students do not recognize when deduction is required to establish a 
result with certainty (Harel & Sowder, 2007; Porteous, 1990; Williams, 
1980). Third, students who still entertain the possibility of finding a 
counterexample after seeing a correct deductive argument (Chazan, 
1993; Fischbein, 1982; Healy & Hoyles, 2000) may be failing to grasp 
the intellectual link between deduction and general claims. Further-
more, the finding that students view reasoning-and-proving as the 
application of theorems, rather than a means of establishing truth or 
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generating knowledge (Herbst & Brach, 2006; Soucy McCrone & Mar-
tin, 2009), suggests these students may not yet perceive the intellec-
tual role of reasoning-and-proving in mathematics. 
In addition to providing an interpretive lens for these past find-
ings, the necessity principle may guide the design of opportunities 
to learn that may move students beyond an empirical proof scheme 
(Harel & Sowder, 2007) toward recognizing the need for deductive 
reasoning when establishing truth for an infinite number of cases. 
Indeed, instructional sequences and strategies have been developed 
(e.g., Buchbinder & Zaslavsky, 2011; Stylianides & Stylianides, 2009) 
to facilitate the intellectual transition from a sole reliance on empiri-
cal reasoning to the use and understanding of inductive and deduc-
tive reasoning together within the reasoning-and-proving process. 
Although it is an important first step to help students become aware 
of times when inductive reasoning is appropriate (e.g., developing 
conjectures) and when it is inappropriate (e.g., validating statements 
about infinitely many objects), the necessity principle pushes us fur-
ther. We must also provide opportunities for students to see that de-
ductive reasoning is necessitated by the situations in which inductive 
reasoning falters. Such understanding of deductive reasoning is espe-
cially crucial in mathematics because mathematics deals with general 
claims about entire, often infinite, classes of objects, and such claims 
can only be verified with certainty by deductive means. 
In this study, we build on past research in two significant ways. 
First, we examine reasoning-and-proving in secondary-level geom-
etry textbooks to complement the past work conducted in other ar-
eas and levels of mathematics. Second, we consider not only the fre-
quency and type of reasoning-and-proving opportunities but also 
the nature of the mathematical statements around which reasoning-
and-proving takes place, thus refining existing analytic frameworks 
for textbook analysis. The research questions that guided the analy-
ses were as follows: 
RQ1. What is the nature and extent of reasoning-and-prov-
ing opportunities contained in secondary-level geometry 
textbooks? 
RQ2. How do the reasoning-and-proving opportunities in geom-
etry textbook exposition compare to the opportunities in 
student exercises? 
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The context in which we address these questions is U.S. textbooks, 
but it is likely that other national contexts have similar kinds of rea-
soning-and-proving opportunities, even if they are not in the same 
proportions, and the broader issues related to our analytic framework 
and the ways in which these opportunities may necessitate deductive 
forms of reasoning are international in scope. 
Method 
Sample 
This study involved six U.S. textbooks (see Table 1) designed for 
stand-alone geometry courses for students approximately 13–16 years 
old. The textbook series from which these geometry texts were drawn 
constitute the mathematics textbooks used by nearly 90% of the sec-
ondary population in the United States (Dossey, Halvorsen, & Soucy 
McCrone, 2008). We have intentionally refrained from characterizing 
any of these textbooks at the onset of the study (e.g., as traditional or 
reform), although it may be appropriate to draw distinctions between 
textbooks based on the results of our analysis. It should be noted, 
however, that there is variation among the authors’ and publishers’ 
Table 1. Geometry Textbooks Analyzed in This Study 
Title  Publisher  Authors  Year 
Geometry (CME)  Pearson  CME Project  2009 
Geometry (Glencoe)  Glencoe McGraw Hill  Carter, Cuevas, Day,  2010 
     Malloy, & Cummins 
Geometry (Holt)  Holt McDougal  Burger, Chard, Kennedy,  2011 
     Leinwand, Renfro, Roby,  
     Seymour, & Waits 
Discovering Geometry  Key Curriculum Press  Serra  2008 
   (Key) 
Geometry (Prentice)  Pearson Prentice Hall  Bass, Charles, Hall,  2009 
     Johnson, & Kennedy 
Geometry (UCSMP)  Wright Group  Benson, Klein, Miller,  2009 
   McGraw Hill     Capuzzi-Feuerstein,    
     Fletcher, Marino, Powell,  
     Jakucyn, & Usiskin 
Note: For clarity, the term in parentheses next to the title is used to refer to each textbook. 
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goals for the textbooks as stated in their prefaces and introductions. 
Because we are examining the opportunities made available to stu-
dents directly by the textbook, rather than opportunities in classroom 
enactment, we restricted our analysis to student editions of these text-
book series. Although teacher’s materials may provide important sup-
port for the way in which student materials are interpreted or enacted 
by teachers, and thus have been used informatively in some textbook 
analyses (e.g., Stylianides, 2009), we believe a teacher’s enactment is 
not solely determined by the teacher’s materials and so chose to code 
only the student edition. 
Also excluded from analysis were supplementary activities such 
as “Activity Labs,” “Explorations,” “Projects,” or additional materials 
available through the publisher’s websites. Admittedly, some of these 
supplements did relate to reasoning-and-proving, but we excluded 
this material from analysis because it would be unwise to attempt to 
capture it all and difficult to know where to draw the line within the 
supplementary materials. Thus, this study does not characterize the 
entirety of each textbook series’ geometry content but rather its ca-
nonical student edition lessons, described next. We believe this scope 
is meaningful because authors and publishers made decisions about 
what reasoning-and-proving opportunities to include in canonical 
lessons and which opportunities to place elsewhere. 
All six textbooks contained numbered sections within each chap-
ter and these sections contained expository text as well as student ex-
ercises. We refer to these textbook sections as lessons and they con-
stituted the primary data of this study. Stratified random sampling 
was used to select the lessons for analysis, with the textbook chapters 
serving as strata. The random samples included a minimum of 30% 
of the lessons from each chapter. For example, we randomly selected 
3 lessons when a chapter contained 10 total lessons (30%) and 4 les-
sons when a chapter contained 11 total lessons (36%). This resulted in 
actual samples of 32%–39% of lessons in each textbook and an over-
all sample of 212 (37%) of the 580 total lessons. Our sampling proce-
dure treated all chapters and lessons equally, even though they may 
not all have the same likelihood of being enacted (Tarr et al., 2006). 
As stated previously, this choice is based on our goal of characteriz-
ing opportunities to reason-and-prove in the textbooks themselves, 
not in classroom enactment. 
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In addition to the expository lessons, we also included in our 
analysis one chapter review from each chapter of each textbook. We 
viewed chapter reviews as the textbook authors’ sample of impor-
tant concepts and procedures from the chapter, thus forming a com-
plement to our own random sample of lessons. Several textbooks in-
cluded more than one chapter review for each chapter, in which case 
we selected the one that appeared to be the most comprehensive of 
the chapter’s expository content. Table 2 shows the number of sec-
tions analyzed for this study. 
Analytic Framework 
Following the recommendations of other textbook analysts (Li, 2000; 
Senk, Thompson, & Johnson, 2008), our study included attention to 
both textbook exposition and student exercises because both contrib-
ute to the potential opportunities students have to engage with rea-
soning-and-proving. By textbook exposition, we mean the paragraphs 
of narrative text in the body of a lesson as well as the text-boxes that 
contain definitions, formulas, theorems, or key ideas. In essence, text-
book exposition refers to the portions of a lesson in which the text-
book authors are presenting information or ideas for consumption by 
a reader. Thus, worked examples (i.e., problems presented along with 
an explained solution) were considered to be part of the textbook ex-
position. By student exercise, we mean an item for which students 
are expected to take an active role by answering a question, solving 
a problem, or completing a particular task. The majority of student 
exercises were located in a separate section of a lesson (i.e., an exer-
cise set) following the textbook exposition, but textbooks did have in-
stances of student exercises interspersed with expository text. 
Table 2. Number of Lessons and Exercises Analyzed in Each Textbook 
Textbook  Expository Lessons  Chapter Reviews  Exercises 
CME  38  8  1058 
Glencoe  33  13  2730 
Holt  31  12  2531 
Key  38  14  1489 
Prentice  31  12  2479 
UCSMP  41  14  2181 
Total  212  73  12,468 
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Thompson and colleagues (2012) developed an analytic framework 
based on NCTM’s (2000) reasoning and proof process standard and 
the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (Valverde et 
al., 2002). This framework formed the basis of our own framework 
because it contained dimensions for both textbook exposition (which 
they referred to as “narrative”) as well as student exercises, and be-
cause it distinguished meaningfully between various types of justi-
fications and reasoning-and-proving activities. For the purposes of 
this study, however, it was necessary to make several modifications 
to their framework, described in detail next. The first of these mod-
ifications was based on the necessity principle (Harel & Tall, 1991) 
and our desire to capture the nature of the mathematical statement 
around which the reasoning-and-proving opportunities were taking 
place. Another modification involved distinguishing between exer-
cises that ask students to “explain” and those that ask students to 
“prove,” which for Thompson and colleagues (2012) both fell under 
the develop an argument code. Other modifications involved only slight 
reinterpretations of existing categories and the inclusion of a few ad-
ditional categories based on pilot analysis and the work of other re-
searchers. We present our framework in its entirety (see Figure 1), 
prior to descriptions of the modifications, to orient the reader for the 
explication that follows. 
Figure 1. An analytic framework for reasoning-and-proving in geometry textbooks. 
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Characterizing Mathematical Statements 
The necessity principle (Harel & Tall, 1991) highlights the importance 
of not only having students engage in deductive reasoning but also 
allowing students to experience the intellectual need for deduction. In 
mathematics, claims made about infinite classes of objects call for a 
shift away from inductive forms of reasoning that are prevalent out-
side mathematics. Two clarifications are in order for this interpreta-
tion of the necessity principle related to deductive reasoning. First, 
a focus on the need for deductive reasoning does not imply that in-
ductive reasoning has no place in mathematical reasoning, but rather 
that deductive reasoning also has a place, especially with regard to 
the justification of claims about infinite classes as opposed to single 
or finite classes (Stylianides & Ball, 2008). Second, the fact that claims 
involving infinite classes of mathematical objects have the potential 
to intellectually motivate deductive reasoning does not imply that 
deduction has no place with regard to finite claims. Indeed, deduc-
tion has value and is often used in reasoning about finite situations. 
Nonetheless, we are positing an intellectual link, broadly speaking, 
between claims involving infinite classes and deductive reasoning. 
To capture in our analytic framework the issue of the motivation 
for deduction, we developed a category of codes relating to the math-
ematical statement or situation of reasoning-and-proving opportuni-
ties. This consideration of mathematical statements is complementary 
to past textbook analyses that focused solely on the activities expected 
of students. The codes for mathematical statements are general, par-
ticular, and general with particular instantiation provided (see Figure 2). 
Note that the inclusion of the words “general” and “particular” in the 
latter code is purposeful as this code reflects aspects of both general 
and particular situations. 
In addition to the necessity principle, the field of logic also pro-
vides a rationale for distinguishing between these three types of math-
ematical statements in textbooks. In logic, if one selects an arbitrary 
element from a set, the notion of universal generalization allows for 
any conclusions drawn that do not appeal to specific characteristics 
of the selected element to be extended to the entire parent set (Hur-
ley, 2006). Indeed, universal generalization is commonplace in mathe-
matical proofs of general claims, as indicated by the typical format of 
first lines (e.g., “Let n be a natural number,” “Let ABC be an arbitrary 
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right triangle”), but it is not required when justifying particular state-
ments. The code of general with particular instantiation provided, then, 
captures the fact that general statements in textbooks may be accom-
panied by a preselected element from the set in question. In such 
cases, students do not necessarily have to take the step of universal 
generalization themselves but can use the specific element provided 
in the textbook. This feature of the written opportunity may be im-
portant if students do not realize that universal generalization is pos-
sible as they reason with the specific element. As a final point of clar-
ification, it is important to realize that the instantiation referred to in 
this code is not a confirming example or diagram being produced as 
Figure 2. Types of mathematical statements for reasoning-and-proving 
opportunities.  
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an initialization of a justification of a general claim, but rather a par-
ticular instance that satisfies the hypothesis stated in the statement 
(in geometry, this often does take the form of a diagram), which can 
subsequently be used by students in the justification process. 
Separating Mathematical Statements from Justifications 
The addition of statement-types to our framework allows us to make 
a clean separation between statement-type and justification-type. Be-
cause general statements and particular statements can both be jus-
tified deductively or empirically (although the justifications are not 
necessarily valid proofs), we view statement-type and justification-
type as independent dimensions (see Figure 3). To highlight this in-
dependence, we use the terms “general” and “particular” to refer ex-
clusively to statements and the terms “deductive” and “empirical” to 
refer exclusively to justifications. 
To solidify the separation of these dimensions, we depart from 
past textbook analyses (e.g., Thompson et al., 2012) by not inferring 
the nature of a students’ justification from the nature of the statement 
they are justifying. In other words, we did not assume that general 
Figure 3. Statement-types and justification-types are independent categories of 
analysis.  
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statements would be justified in general ways or particular statements 
in nongeneral ways, which means that findings related to the state-
ment-type dimension of this analytic framework should not be con-
strued as claims about resultant students’ reasoning. Instead, we used 
the following codes to capture the type of justification that a student 
exercise called for, if such a call was made explicitly in the text: 
• Deductive—the item explicitly calls for a “deductive argument” 
or a “logical chain” of justifications; 
• Empirical—the item explicitly calls for measurements or con-
firming examples; 
• Implicit—the item asks students to engage in reasoning-and-
proving (e.g., “Prove . . .” or “Explain why . . .”) but does not 
explicitly specify the nature of the argument to be produced.  
We acknowledge that, with these definitions, the majority of stu-
dent exercises will fall in the implicit category with regard to justifi-
cation type. Nevertheless, we feel that it is important to capture the 
reasoning-and-proving opportunities as explicitly represented in text-
books, especially because it is not clear that students interpret direc-
tions to “prove” or “show” in the same way that mathematicians or 
mathematics educators do. By using the implicit code rather than mak-
ing assumptions about what students might produce, we are attempt-
ing to reduce inference in our analysis and to demarcate our study as 
one of textbook opportunities rather than student reasoning. 
Separating Opportunities to Prove from Opportunities to Explain 
Drawing on Stylianides’ framework (2009) as well as others who have 
philosophically distinguished between proof and explanation (Drey-
fus, 1999; Sierpinska, 1994), we divided Thompson and colleagues’ 
(2012) category of develop an argument into two separate categories: 
construct a proof and develop a rationale or other non-proof argument. 
Within student exercises, we followed Hanna and de Bruyn (1999) 
and Bieda (2010) in using keywords as the primary means of distin-
guishing between these two categories. We associated terms such as 
“explain,” “justify,” “show,” or “why” with develop a rationale or other 
non-proof argument and terms such as “prove” or “deduce” with con-
struct a proof . Although we admit that it is possible for students to 
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respond to an “explain” or “justify” prompt by providing a full math-
ematical proof—especially for those who recognize that proofs explain 
mathematical ideas (Hanna, 1990)—we maintain that the reasoning-
and-proving opportunities differ and thus reserved the category of 
construct a proof for those items in which the textbooks authors chose 
to explicitly invoke the notion of proof. For “explain,” we coded only 
those items asking students to explain why something was true or 
false and not the items asking students to explain without a rationale 
the steps they carried out. 
Codes Inherited from Thompson, Senk, and Johnson 
The following codes from Thompson and colleagues (2012) for ex-
pected activity within student exercises were used with only slight 
modifications: 
• Make a conjecture, refine a mathematical statement, or draw a 
conclusion—students are asked to formulate a mathematical 
claim or modify a false conjecture into one that the student 
believes is true. If students are also asked to support the 
resulting claim, an additional code or codes captures this 
supporting activity. 
• Investigate a conjecture or statement—students are asked 
to determine the truth-value of a given conjecture or to 
determine the truth-value of something they just conjectured 
themselves. 
• Evaluate or correct an argument or proof—an argument or proof is 
presented and students are asked to determine whether it is 
valid or to find the error(s) and correct them. 
• Find a counterexample to a mathematical claim—students are 
asked to supply a counterexample that disproves a given 
mathematical claim. 
With respect to exposition, there were also several codes from 
Thompson and colleagues (2012) that we included in our framework 
with minimal modification (e.g., renaming): 
• Deductive justification—the textbook provides a logical 
argument building on definitions, postulates, or previously 
established results to support or prove a mathematical claim. 
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• Empirical justification—the textbook provides a confirming 
example to a mathematical claim or infers the truth of the 
claim from a subset of the relevant cases. 
• Justification left to student—rather than providing a justification 
in the textbook exposition, it is explicitly stated that students 
will be providing the justification (e.g., later in the exercise 
set). 
• No justification—there is no justification for a given 
mathematical claim in the textbook exposition, and it is 
not explicitly stated that students will later produce a 
justification. 
Codes Added Based on Pilot Analysis of Geometry Textbooks 
Because reasoning-and-proving was expected to be more prevalent in 
geometry textbooks than other areas, we conducted pilot analysis and 
added the following categories of justification for textbook exposition: 
• Outline—the textbook exposition contains an outline of a proof 
or the key step of a proof that would establish the truth of a 
mathematical claim. 
• Past or future—rather than providing a justification in the text-
book exposition, it is explicitly stated that a proof or other 
form of justification can be found in a past lesson or course, 
a future lesson or course, or somewhere external to the text-
book (e.g., the Internet). 
Within student exercises, we added the following categories of ex-
pected reasoning-and-proving activity: 
• Fill in the blanks of a conjecture—students are asked to complete 
a mathematical conjecture for which a portion is already 
provided. 
• Outline—students are asked to provide an outline of a proof or 
to write a full proof from a given outline. 
• Fill in the blanks of an argument or proof —students are provided 
with a partial argument or proof and are asked to fill in the 
missing components, thus forming a complete argument or 
proof. 
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Statements or Exercises About Reasoning-and-Proving 
The final component of our analytic framework involved capturing 
the opportunities embedded in the geometry textbooks to reflect on 
or think about reasoning-and-proving as a mathematical practice. 
Following Hanna and de Bruyn (1999), who identified discussions 
about proof as separate from the act of proving, we coded statements 
about reasoning-and-proving and exercises about reasoning-and-prov-
ing as elements of textbook exposition and student exercises, respec-
tively. These statements are pertinent to code because (a) geometry 
textbooks are perhaps the most likely place in school mathematics 
for reasoning-and-proving to become an explicit object of reflection, 
(b) many student difficulties around reasoning-and-proving involve 
the conception of the process itself, and (c) helping students become 
aware of the intellectual need for mathematical proof and deductive 
forms of reasoning, an aim suggested by the necessity principle, may 
involve giving students opportunities to reflect on the process rather 
than only engaging in it. Examples of this code involve the form of 
mathematical proofs (e.g., two-column proofs, flow proofs), the meth-
ods of proof (e.g., proof by contradiction) or forms of reasoning (e.g., 
inductive versus deductive), and explanations of strategies for con-
structing a proof (e.g., work backward). We recognize that many op-
portunities to reflect on reasoning-and-proving may be embedded in 
the teacher’s guides rather than the student editions, but that is be-
yond the scope of the present study. 
Having described the various components of the framework, we 
refer the reader back to Figure 1 for a visual depiction. 
Analytic Procedures 
Within each of the 212 lessons in our sample, we identified any ex-
pository mathematical statements such as theorems, postulates, 
properties, formulas, identities, or other claims of a mathematical 
truth (e.g., that a given diagram has a certain property). Mathemat-
ical definitions were not coded, but worked examples that included 
a prompt for reasoning-and-proving were coded as exposition. The 
statements included in analysis were then coded for their statement-
type and their justification-type, with multiple codes being assigned 
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if a single statement was justified multiple times. To check reliabil-
ity, we performed double coding on a 20% subsample of lessons that 
yielded 95% agreement on statement-type and 91% agreement on jus-
tification-type within textbook exposition. It should be noted that, al-
though postulates cannot be proven deductively, we included them in 
our analysis because they are mathematical claims and have interest-
ing implications when considering the role of deductive arguments in 
establishing claims as true—postulates are accepted as true without 
deductive justification. This choice to include postulates means our 
analysis included more instances of no justification or empirical jus-
tification in textbook exposition than if we had excluded postulates, 
so we report postulates separately in the results. 
For student exercises in the sampled lessons and chapter reviews, 
the reasoning-and-proving framework was taken to be exhaustive of 
the types of reasoning-and-proving items. In other words, if an item 
did not fall into one of the categories of reasoning-and-proving ac-
tivity in Figure 1, we did not include it in our analysis.3 Examples of 
excluded items were those asking students to determine unknown 
measures in a given diagram, solve length or area problems, or iden-
tify geometric entities such as medians or orthocenters. Exercises that 
did involve at least one of the reasoning-and-proving activities, then, 
were subsequently coded for that activity as well as the type of math-
ematical statement involved and the type of justification expected. 
The unit of analysis was items as partitioned by numbers or letters 
in the textbook. So, for example, an exercise with parts a–d was con-
sidered as four separate items. A single item, however, could receive 
multiple codes if it involved multiple reasoning-and-proving activ-
ities (e.g., investigate a conjecture and provide a rationale). The reli-
ability check in the case of student exercises yielded 92% agreement 
on statement-type and 93% agreement on activity-type. Because im-
plicit codes were so prevalent for justification-type (as expected), re-
sults along this dimension are not reported in the results.  
3. It is important to note that our analytic framework excludes patterning exercises 
(e.g., determine the hundredth entry in a given pattern) from reasoning-and-
proving, although Stylianides (2009) and Davis (2010) included such exercises in 
their studies of reform-oriented curricula. If, however, a geometry textbook asked 
students to conjecture or prove a statement based on a pattern, we included the 
item as reasoning-and-proving.   
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With respect to items about reasoning and proving, exercises of this 
sort were coded but did not receive any other codes. Within textbook 
exposition, based on pilot analysis and issues of reliability, the unit of 
analysis for these codes was not the sentence level or the paragraph 
level but the theme level. For example, if multiple sentences were 
dealing with the same theme with respect to reasoning-and-prov-
ing, we assigned a single code, but if a paragraph contained two sep-
arable points relating to the practice of reasoning-and-proving, we 
coded two instances. 
Results 
In presenting the results, we first describe the reasoning-and-proving 
opportunities embedded in the geometry textbooks with respect to 
textbook exposition and then with respect to student exercises (RQ1). 
Generally speaking, opportunities to reason-and-prove were found 
to be more numerous than in textbooks for other levels of areas of 
mathematics but not as numerous as one might expect given the tra-
ditional link between reasoning-and-proving and geometry. The fre-
quencies of opportunities to construct a proof and to think about rea-
soning-and-proving were especially low. 
Next, we present an analysis of similarities and differences across 
the exposition and exercises with regard to the nature of reasoning-
and-proving opportunities in these two contexts (RQ2). The most 
striking result in this case was that general mathematical statements 
constitute the majority of reasoning-and-proving items in exposition, 
but particular statements were more common in student exercises. 
Moreover, when general statements did appear in exercises, a sub-
stantial portion of them came with a particular instantiation provided, 
which has implications for the intellectual necessity of proof and the 
steps of deductive reasoning. 
For the results overall, reasoning-and-proving opportunities are 
treated in aggregate for entire textbooks, but this is not to say that the 
opportunities were distributed evenly over the chapters of the text-
books. Elsewhere (Otten, Males, & Gilbertson, in press) we take up 
this specific issue through an analysis of the opportunities in certain 
chapters in contrast to others. 
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Reasoning-and-Proving in Textbook Exposition 
Table 3 reports for each textbook the frequency of reasoning-and-
proving items appearing in the expository sections, such as theorems, 
postulates, certain worked examples, or statements about reasoning-
and-proving. However, direct comparison of frequencies between 
the textbooks are problematic for a variety of reasons, and we there-
fore turn to more detailed results of reasoning-and-proving in text-
book exposition. 
Types of Statements in Textbook Exposition 
Table 4 shows the types of mathematical statements that appeared re-
lated to reasoning-and-proving in textbook exposition. General state-
ments were prevalent in the exposition sections of all six textbooks. 
Table 3. Frequency of Reasoning-and-Proving Items in Textbook Exposition 
  No. of Expository No. of Reasoning-and-  Reasoning-and-Proving  
Textbook Lessons Analyzed  Proving Items Items per Lesson 
CME  38  95  2.5 
Glencoe  33  172  5.2 
Holt  31  154  5.0 
Key  38  130  3.4 
Prentice  31  138  4.5 
UCSMP  41  218  5.3 
Note: Chapter reviews are not included as expository lessons. 
 
Table 4. Types of Statements in Textbook Exposition 
                     No. of General Statements (%)  No. of Particular No. of Statements About 
Textbook Non-Postulate Postulate  Statements (%)  Reasoning- and-Proving (%) 
CME  69 (64)  8 (8)  13 (14)  13 (14) 
Glencoe  109 (63)  10 (6)  45 (26)  8 (5) 
Holt  94 (61)  8 (5)  37 (24)  15 (10) 
Key  73 (56)  35* (27)  8 (6)  14 (11) 
Prentice  87 (63)  16 (12)  28 (20)  7 (5) 
UCSMP  146 (67)  11 (5)  20 (9)  41 (19) 
* Approximately half of Key’s postulates came from a single lesson that listed postulates 
from algebra and related postulates in geometry. 
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In Key, 83% of statements were general in nature while only 6% were 
about particular objects or situations. Even in Glencoe and Holt, 
where the percentage of general statements was the lowest, there 
were still more than two general statements for every one particular 
statement. Key (6%), UCSMP (9%), and CME (14%) had relatively few 
statements of a particular nature in their expository sections. 
In all books, particular statements related to reasoning-and-prov-
ing were predominantly worked examples. For example, Prentice con-
tained a worked example of a proof about a particular quadrilateral 
(see Figure 4) that used the Hypotenuse-leg theorem, introduced ear-
lier in the same expository section. 
There was variability between textbooks in the frequency of state-
ments about the practice of reasoning-and-proving. UCSMP had 
the highest percentage of such statements (19%), with an average 
of 1 statement about reasoning-and-proving every lesson. An exam-
ple of such a statement from UCSMP is when the textbook authors 
pointed out “the difference between proof and disproof ” (p. 96, em-
phasis in original) in that the latter only requires one counterexam-
ple, whereas the former requires more than confirming examples. In 
a later chapter, following a worked example that contained a proof, 
UCSMP also noted that “[t]he last statement of the proof in Example 
2 is imperative. . . . You must justify why your calculations prove the 
statement that is to be proved” (p. 671). Holt (10%) had 1 statement 
about reasoning-and-proving every 2 lessons and both Key (11%) and 
CME (14%) had approximately 1 such statement every 3 lessons. For 
Glencoe (5%) and Prentice (5%), these averages were 1 for every 4–5 
lessons. 
Figure 4. A worked example adapted from Prentice (p. 237) containing a particu-
lar statement being proved deductively.  
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Types of Justifications in Textbook Exposition 
With the exception of statements about the practice of reasoning-and-
proving, each reasoning-and-proving item in the textbook exposition 
was coded for the type of justification provided (see Table 5). Deduc-
tive arguments were used to justify 42% of the reasoning-and-prov-
ing items in UCSMP and 36% of the items in both Holt and Prentice. 
Glencoe employed deductive justifications 30% of the time and CME 
did so 27% of the time. Key was the only textbook to use empirical 
arguments (55%) more frequently than deductive arguments (19%), 
although CME had a nearly even split with 24% empirical to 27% de-
ductive. Holt and Glencoe were the least likely to give empirical argu-
ments at 9% and 16%, respectively, but they were also the most likely 
to leave the justification to the student (26% and 34%, respectively). 
In addition to deductive and empirical arguments, the other pri-
mary justification codes were no justification or explicitly stating that 
the students would be expected to supply an argument. Glencoe left 
the justification to students most often (34%), whereas Key (5%) and 
UCSMP (4%) did so least often. Key was the least likely textbook to 
omit a justification, doing so for only 9% of the reasoning-and-prov-
ing statements. The other five textbooks omitted justifications approx-
imately 20%–30% of the time. When interpreting the omission of jus-
tifications, one should refer to Table 4 to the number of postulates 
coded in each textbook because these were usually and understand-
ably presented without justification. In some instances (particularly 
in Key), however, empirical support for a postulate was given or a 
reference was made to the students having learned the postulate in 
a past course. 
Table 5. Percentages of Justification-Types in Textbook Exposition 
 Deductive  Empirical   Left to  Past or  Not 
Textbook  Argument  Argument  Outline  Student  Future  Justified 
CME  27  24  5  17  12  28 
Glencoe  30  16  0  34  8  17 
Holt  36  9  0  26  7  25 
Key  19  55  3  5  15  9 
Prentice  36  26  2  14  8  24 
UCSMP  42  24  1  4  13  27 
Note: Rows sum to more than 100 because a statement may be justified in multiple ways. 
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Summary 
The six geometry textbooks contain approximately 2.5 to 5 reason-
ing-and-proving statements per expository lesson. Of these reason-
ing-and-proving statements, roughly three-quarters involved a gen-
eral class of mathematical objects (e.g., theorems or formulas), that 
is, the types of statements that arguably lay the foundation for ped-
agogy that necessitates deductive forms of reasoning. There were 
relatively few statements of a particular nature in the textbook ex-
position, and when such statements did occur they were usually in 
the form of worked examples. Justifications in the textbook exposi-
tion were divided fairly evenly between deductive arguments, em-
pirical arguments, left-to-student, and no justification. Exceptions to 
this relatively even distribution of justifications were the following: 
Holt, which tended not to employ empirical arguments; Key, which 
employed many empirical arguments; and UCSMP, which provided 
more deductive arguments and left less to the students than the other 
textbooks. 
Reasoning-and-Proving in Student Exercises 
Our analysis validated the assumption that reasoning-and-proving is 
most prevalent in secondary-level geometry as reasoning-and-prov-
ing exercises constituted one-fifth to two-fifths of the total student 
exercises, which is a substantially higher portion than found in other 
areas (Davis, 2010; Thompson et al., 2012; Stylianides, 2009). Table 6 
contains frequencies of reasoning-and-proving exercises in each of 
the textbooks. 
Table 6. Frequency of Reasoning-and-Proving Exercises 
 No. of  No. of  No. of Reasoning- Reasoning-and- 
 Lessons  Exercises  and-Proving    Proving Exercises 
Textbook  Analyzed  Analyzed  Exercises (%)  per Lesson 
CME  46  1058  400 (38)  8.7 
Glencoe  46  2730  663 (24)  14.4 
Holt  43  2531  597 (24)  13.9 
Key  52  1489  397 (27)  7.6 
Prentice  43  2479  484 (20)  11.3 
UCSMP  55  2181  601 (28)  10.9 
Note. Lessons in this table include chapter reviews. 
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CME, which had the lowest frequency of reasoning-and-proving 
statements in exposition, had the highest percentage of reasoning-and-
proving exercises (38%), whereas Prentice had the lowest percentage 
(20%). Glencoe and Holt, the textbooks with the most total exercises 
(see Table 2), had the highest frequencies of reasoning-and-proving 
exercises per lesson at 14.4 and 13.9, respectively. Key and CME, the 
textbooks with the least exercises analyzed, had the lowest frequen-
cies per lesson (7.6 and 8.7, resp.). Note throughout this section that, 
as noted previously, these exercises only represent potential opportu-
nities to engage in reasoning-and-proving as there can be great vari-
ability between and within textbooks with respect to the exercises ac-
tually assigned by teachers and actually completed by students. 
Types of Statements in Student Exercises 
As Table 7 shows, particular statements were prevalent in the exer-
cises of all six textbooks. In Holt, 72% of reasoning-and-proving ex-
ercises involved a particular mathematical statement. For example, 
in Holt (p. 324), students were asked to show that, within the triangle 
with vertices of (–6, 11), (6, –3), and (–2, –5), the segment connecting 
the midpoints of two sides of the triangle is parallel to and half the 
length of the third side; this exercise involves reasoning only around 
that specific triangle. Similarly, Prentice, Glencoe, and UCSMP in-
cluded particular statements in approximately 60%–65% of reason-
ing-and-proving exercises. Figure 5 depicts an example of a partic-
ular statement in a proof exercise from Glencoe. Key and CME, on 
the other hand, approximated a balanced split between general state-
ments and particular statements. 
Table 7. Types of Statements in Reasoning-and-Proving Exercises 
 No. of  No. of  No. of General  No. of Exercises 
  General  Particular  Statements with  about Reasoning- 
Textbook  Statements (%) Statements (%) Instantiation (%)  and-Proving (%) 
CME  181 (45)  206 (52)  9 (2)  4 (1) 
Glencoe  180 (27)  398 (60)  68 (10)  17 (3) 
Holt  117 (20)  430 (72)  33 (5)  17 (3) 
Key  174 (44)  190 (48)  20 (5)  13 (3) 
Prentice  130 (27)  315 (65)  37 (8)  2 (0) 
UCSMP  214 (36)  351 (58)  22 (4)  14 (2) 
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A modest number of exercises involved reasoning-and-proving 
around a general statement with a particular instantiation provided 
by the textbook. For instance, Holt asked students to prove the Ex-
terior Angle theorem, which is stated generally, but then provided a 
particular labeled diagram for students to work with (see Figure 6). 
The category of general statements with particular instantiation be-
comes more noteworthy when one compares it with the number of 
general statements rather than the total number of reasoning-and-
proving exercises. Specifically, of the reasoning-and-proving exercises 
in Glencoe, Prentice, and Holt that involved some form of general 
mathematical statement, 27%, 22%, and 22% provided a particular 
instantiation for the students to reason with, respectively. As for ex-
ercises about the practice of reasoning-and-proving, none of the text-
books exceeded 3% of reasoning-and-proving exercises being of this 
variety. In terms of total exercises analyzed, the portion is less than 
1 in 180 exercises. 
Types of Reasoning-and-Proving Activities in Student Exercises 
Past studies of reasoning-and-proving in textbooks focused on the 
types of activities expected of students. Table 8 follows this conven-
tion by depicting the percentages of various reasoning-and- proving 
Figure 5. An adapted example of a particular statement in a reasoning-and-prov-
ing exercise from Glencoe (p. 155).  
Figure 6. An adapted example of a general exercise with a particular instantiation 
provided in the Holt textbook (p. 229).  
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activities found in the six geometry textbooks we examined. Note that 
Table 8 should be interpreted with regard to Table 6 because the lat-
ter indicates how many reasoning-and-proving items were identified 
overall, which form the basis of the percentages in Table 8. 
In four of the textbooks, 13%–15% of their reasoning-and-proving 
exercises (or 3%–4% of their total exercises) involved students con-
structing a proof. In CME and Glencoe, proof comprised 25% and 28% 
of their reasoning-and-proving exercises, respectively (or 9% and 7% 
of their total exercises). The most common reasoning-and-proving ac-
tivities were to investigate a statement (i.e., determine the truth-value 
of a mathematical claim) and to develop a rationale (i.e., to explain or 
justify an answer or result in a manner that is not necessarily a proof).
With the exception of Holt (8%), approximately 15%–20% of reason-
ing-and-proving exercises involved students making a conjecture. 
Statement-Types of Proof-Focused Exercises 
It is worthwhile to consider the interaction between activity-type and 
statement-type in student exercises, particularly with regard to exer-
cises that deal explicitly with proof, captured by the following codes: 
construct a proof, outline a proof or construct a proof given an outline, fill-
in-the-blanks of an argument or proof, and evaluate or correct an argument 
or proof. Of these explicitly proof-focused exercises, Figure 7 depicts 
the breakdown of general statements, particular statements, and gen-
eral statements with particular instantiations provided. 
Prentice, Holt, and UCSMP had approximately two-thirds of 
proof-focused exercises take place around particular statements. 
Table 8. Percentages of Activity-Types in Reasoning-and-Proving Exercises 
 Construct  Develop a Find a  Investigate a  Make a 
Textbook  a Proof  Rationale  Counterexample  Statement  Conjecture  Other 
CME  25  36  7  44  16  3 
Glencoe  28  48  4  30  17  5 
Holt  13  42  4  39  8  16 
Key  13  52  26  42  20  6 
Prentice  15  54  1  46  19  11 
UCSMP  14  44  3  36  14  5 
Note: Rows sum to more than 100 because an exercise may involve multiple activities. 
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Furthermore, within these three textbooks, a sizeable portion of the 
nonparticular statements were presented with a particular instantia-
tion for the student to reason with, removing the need for students to 
engage in the step of universal generalization. In CME and Glencoe, 
approximately one-half of proof-focused exercises took place around 
particular statements, although Glencoe provided more particular in-
stantiations for general statements than did CME. Key stood out as 
having the lowest percentage of particular proof-focused exercises 
(29%), but it also had the highest percentage of proof-focused exer-
cises in which a particular instantiation was provided for a general 
statement (25%). 
Summary 
Most reasoning-and-proving exercises took place around particular 
mathematical statements rather than general statements, and of the 
general statements a sizeable portion had particular instantiations 
provided for students. In both the particular and general-with-par-
ticular-instantiation-provided situations, reasoning can occur around 
a single or finite number of cases and so deductive reasoning is not 
necessitated to the same degree as with general statements. It should 
be noted, however, that Key and CME approached a balanced split 
between general and particular statements. The most common rea-
soning-and-proving activities asked of students were determining 
Figure 7. Percentages of statements-types of those reasoning-and-proving exercises 
explicitly focusing on proof.  
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the truth-value of a mathematical claim and providing explanations 
or other nonproof justifications of mathematical statements. In two 
books (CME and Glencoe) at least one-quarter of the reasoning-and-
proving exercises asked students to construct a proof; in the other 
books, such items comprised only 13%–15% of the reasoning-and-
proving items. Of the exercises explicitly dealing with proof, all text-
books except Key were more likely to have such exercises involve a 
particular mathematical statement than a general one. 
Comparing Textbook Exposition to Student Exercises 
Although it is possible for textbook exposition to be enacted in such 
a way that students actively participate in developing the exposi-
tory material—indeed, this seems to be the intention behind the de-
sign of CME (Cuoco, 2007) and Key (Key Curriculum Press, 2008)—
it remains reasonable to assume that students will, to some extent, 
be readers or recipients of the expository content. By the same token, 
one might expect students to take a more active part in the written 
exercises than in the textbook exposition. Because of this distinction, 
we turn our attention in this section to a comparison between the re-
sults of the textbook exposition and the student exercises. 
Figure 8 compares textbook exposition and student exercises with 
respect to the percentage of reasoning-and-proving items that were 
general in nature for each portion of the textbook. For example, in 
Figure 8. The nature of mathematical statements in textbook exposition versus stu-
dent exercises.   
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CME, 73% of reasoning-and-proving items in the exposition involved 
general statements, whereas 45% of reasoning-and-proving exercises 
involved such statements. Figure 8 reveals a stark contrast between 
the types of mathematical statements represented in the textbook ex-
position and those in the student exercises: at least two-thirds of the 
reasoning-and-proving items in the exposition, and as many as four-
fifths were general in nature. In contrast, less than half and even as 
little as one-fifth of the statements within the reasoning-and-proving 
exercises were general. Furthermore, when particular statements did 
appear in expository sections they were usually in the form of worked 
examples (see Figure 6, for example), which may be interpreted as the 
textbook authors presenting what would otherwise be considered a 
student exercise. Conversely, when general statements appeared in 
student exercises, they were often accompanied by a particular in-
stantiation of the general claim, which does not lay the same founda-
tion for adherence to the necessity principle. In other words, the gap 
between statement-types in exposition versus exercises grows rather 
than shrinks when we consider nuanced factors such as worked ex-
amples and particular instantiations. 
Of the mathematical claims presented in textbook expositions, 
many were justified deductively but many were also justified empir-
ically. Within the exercises, the type of justification to be provided by 
the student was most often left implicit. If we assume that students 
interpret “prove” to be calling for a deductive argument, then there 
were a fair number of opportunities for students to develop deduc-
tive arguments. “Explain” exercises, however, were much more com-
mon than “prove” exercises and it is unclear whether students inter-
pret prompts to explain as opportunities to employ a deductive line of 
reasoning. Also with regard to justification, five textbooks’ exposition 
included no justification for approximately one-quarter of their math-
ematical statements, although some of these were likely postulates. 
(In Key, this was true for only 9% of such statements.) Similarly, there 
were many exercises that asked students to make a conjecture or de-
termine the truth-value of a mathematical claim without also asking 
the students to explain, justify, or prove that claim. For example, in 
Key, students were asked to complete the following statement, which 
Key referred to as a conjecture: “If two angles are both congruent and 
supplementary, then ? ” (p. 125). They were not asked to justify this 
conjecture. Many textbooks gave sets of claims and asked students 
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to decide if they were always true, sometimes true, or never true, but 
did not require a justification for these decisions (although at other 
times, they may have been accompanied by requests for justification). 
Finally, concerning statements or exercises about the practice of 
reasoning-and-proving, there was strong similarity between the ex-
pository sections and the student exercises in that such opportuni-
ties were rare in both places. Less than one-quarter of the analyzed 
expository lessons contained even a single comment about reason-
ing-and-proving as a mathematical practice. Only UCSMP had a size-
able number of such statements, with at least one appearing in 40% 
of their sampled lessons. Likewise, less than 0.6% of the analyzed ex-
ercises asked students to reflect on or write about the reasoning-and-
proving process. These frequencies may be viewed as low for second-
ary-level geometry texts because this is typically the setting in school 
mathematics where students learn about the reasoning process and 
mathematical proof most explicitly. 
Discussion 
In this article, we have shared results of an investigation of the rea-
soning-and-proving opportunities embedded in six different U.S. 
geometry textbooks. Overall, approximately one-quarter of the text-
book exercises analyzed asked students to engage in reasoning-and-
proving activities, and the construction of a proof was entailed in 
less than 5%. These percentages are higher than have been found in 
even the most proof-focused sections of U.S. algebra and pre-calcu-
lus textbooks (Thompson et al., 2012), a middle school textbook se-
ries (Stylianides, 2009), and an integrated high school textbook se-
ries (Davis, 2010). For geometry, however, which typically represents 
the high point of reasoning-and-proving opportunities in the school 
curriculum (Hanna & de Bruyn, 1999; Herbst, 2002), these quanti-
ties of reasoning-and-proving opportunities may be viewed as lim-
ited in light of the calls for reasoning-and-proving to be integral to 
the school mathematics curriculum (NCTM, 2000, 2009; NGA & CC-
SSO, 2010) and the fact that proof specifically is present in 24% of the 
Common Core State Standards geometry standards (Kosko & Herbst, 
2011). Moreover, deductive arguments were provided for less than 
half the claims coded in textbook exposition, which extends a finding 
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of Thompson and colleagues (2012) in nongeometry textbooks, where 
approximately 30% of expository properties were justified deduc-
tively. The scope of our study, however, does not allow for inferences 
to be made with regard to ideal proportions of certain kinds of rea-
soning-and-proving opportunities, and as the design of our analytic 
framework has emphasized, it is important to consider not only the 
quantity of the reasoning-and-proving opportunities but their qual-
ity in terms of helping students see the intellectual need for this im-
portant mathematical practice. 
With the exception of UCSMP, statements or questions about rea-
soning-and-proving as a mathematical practice were rare. Such op-
portunities have the potential to not only allow students to reflect on 
the nature of their mathematical activity but also to develop meta-
cognitive skills that have been shown to be important in the reason-
ing-and-proving process (Schoenfeld, 1992; Weber, 2001). This scarcity 
suggests students’ opportunities, as reflected in curriculum materials, 
to actively engage in reasoning-and-proving outweigh their oppor-
tunities to reflect on reasoning-and-proving. Hence it becomes even 
more important to examine the nature of the opportunities to actively 
reason-and-prove. Are such experiences representative of the disci-
plinary practice of reasoning-and-proving? Do they lay a foundation 
for pedagogy that adheres to the necessity principle with respect to 
deductive reasoning? These questions stretch beyond the specific U.S. 
context of the present study. 
The most common reasoning-and-proving activities were provid-
ing a rationale (not necessarily a proof) and determining the truth-
value of a mathematical claim.4 That is, students had many more 
opportunities to make judgments about the truth of a claim than 
they did to provide deductive arguments—the disciplinary process 
by which truth is established. From the perspective of the necessity 
principle (Harel & Tall, 1991), it may be insufficient to ask students 
4 With respect to the prominence of rationale exercises, one might contend that an 
“explain” prompt provides students with an opportunity to construct a proof 
because a key function of mathematical proofs is explanation (de Villiers, 1995; 
Hanna, 1995). This leads to the question, however, of whether students realize 
that a proof would be an effective response to a rationale exercise. Answering this 
question would take us beyond the realm of textbook analysis, although we can 
note that Herbst and Brach (2006) found that geometry students viewed proof 
tasks to be distinct from explanation tasks. 
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to frequently indicate the truth or falsity of mathematical statements, 
and presumably come to conviction about that truth or falsity, with-
out also providing a justification or with only a prompt for a nonrig-
orous explanation. 
This is not to say that there was a complete absence of opportuni-
ties to engage in the development of deductive justifications. These op-
portunities, however, were most commonly around a particular math-
ematical statement or, at other times, around a general statement with 
a particular instantiation provided. Such exercises, we contend, do not 
necessitate deductive forms of reasoning to the same extent as exercises 
around general statements.5 When a student is faced with a particular 
diagram of parallel lines cut by a transversal, for example, and is asked 
to show that a specific angle in the given diagram measures 40°, it is not 
unreasonable to approach this situation by using a protractor to mea-
sure the angle in question. Indeed, this approach makes a great deal of 
sense if the context were the practical world. Mathematics, however, is 
unique in its concern for general claims—in this case, assertions about 
any pair of parallel lines cut by an arbitrary transversal—where induc-
tive reasoning falters and deductive reasoning is needed.  
Much of the existing literature on students’ abilities and concep-
tions with respect to reasoning-and-proving is consonant with our 
finding that particular statements are prevalent in student exercises. 
For example, although there are exercises that ask students to prove 
or justify mathematical claims, the paucity of exercises that necessi-
tate deductive forms of reasoning suggests that students, even after 
their secondary-level geometry course, may have difficulty producing 
proofs and may continue to rely on empirical forms of reasoning (e.g., 
Chazan, 1993; Harel & Sowder, 2007; Herbst & Brach, 2006; Selden & 
Selden, 2003). Moreover, this may partially explain why Senk (1985) 
found in her large-scale study of proof performance among U.S. ge-
ometry students that students were more successful in proving par-
ticular statements than general statements. 
5 These proof opportunities around particular statements, although they may 
achieve many of the state standards for proof in geometry, do not seem to align 
with the new proof standards as outline in the Common Core State Standards (NGA 
& CCSSO, 2010). As Kosko and Herbst (2011) noted, the Common Core proof stan-
dards often relate to important pieces of content in such a way that these stan-
dards are not likely to be met with “token proof exercises whose conclusions are 
not memorable” (p. 7).   
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Herbst and Brach (2006), in a study of geometry students, found 
that students were more confident that they would be accountable for 
proving a statement presented in Given-Prove format than for prov-
ing a general statement such as “a line through the midpoints of two 
sides of a triangle is parallel to the third side and half its length” (p. 
84). Furthermore, the students in their study tended not to accept re-
sponsibility for proving propositions that contained key mathemati-
cal ideas, such as those that we found predominantly in textbook ex-
position. Moreover, Soucy McCrone and Martin (2009) interviewed 
geometry students who reported that the purpose of proof is merely 
to apply recently learned theorems. If these students had been using 
a textbook from this study, their perception is justifiable—we found 
it to be uncommon for students to have opportunities to prove im-
portant mathematical results but typical for them to have opportu-
nities to use established theorems to prove something about partic-
ular situations. 
One might argue that it is necessary for key mathematical results 
(i.e., general statements) to be explicated in expository sections so that 
they may be officially recognized in the classroom canon and, more-
over, that it is necessary to provide students with numerous particu-
lar statements to prove because practice is essential and there are not 
enough relevant general statements to allow for an adequate amount 
of reasoning-and-proving practice. In response to these points, we 
would draw attention to the fact that this is essentially an argument 
in favor of the status quo with respect to reasoning-and-proving in-
struction, and the research as well as the policy documents we have 
cited in this article indicate that the current state of reasoning-and-
proving in geometry is not producing the student outcomes that the 
international mathematics education community hopes to see. In the 
end, our collective goal is not only for students to have success with 
reasoning-and-proving but also to see its intellectual necessity and 
its value in mathematics. 
We wish to explicitly state that none of the textbook trends iden-
tified in this study are inherently good, bad, beneficial, or problem-
atic. With respect to statement types, although reasoning-and-prov-
ing around particular statements may not necessitate deduction to 
the same degree as general statements, they may provide rich oppor-
tunities for teachers to help students see the general in the particular 
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(Mason & Pimm, 1984) and “think big” even as they are “talking 
small” (Cuoco, Goldenberg, & Mark, 1996, p. 384). Particular state-
ments can form a basis for enacting meaningful shifts to more gen-
eral types of reasoning. As Reid and Knipping (2010) pointed out, 
proofs in geometry often fall between generic arguments, wherein an 
example represents a larger class, and symbolic arguments, wherein 
words and abstract symbols represent the class, because in geometry 
there is often a reliance on a specific diagram. This intersection of ar-
gument-types relates to the statement-type that we coded as general 
statements accompanied by particular instantiations. Although such 
opportunities to reason-and-prove open up the possibility of students 
omitting the logical step of universal generalization, they can be en-
acted in productive ways to draw attention to precisely that issue of 
selecting an arbitrary element with which to reason about an entire 
set. This process may help students develop the habit of “thinking 
small” as they “talk big” (Cuoco et al., 1996). Moreover, this study 
examined only proportions of various types of opportunities and did 
not attend to the sequencing of activities, which may be important 
with regard to students’ learning of reasoning-and-proving. None-
theless, rather than ascribing value to the written opportunities, we 
are claiming in this article that an awareness of the nature of such rea-
soning-and-proving opportunities is important both for teachers, re-
searchers, and curriculum developers. Moreover, students may ben-
efit from having explicit discussions about these issues. 
In conclusion, this study makes two primary contributions to the 
research on reasoning-and-proving in school mathematics textbooks. 
First, by characterizing the nature and extent of reasoning-and-prov-
ing opportunities in U.S. geometry textbooks, this study comple-
ments the work that has already been done outside of geometry (Da-
vis, 2010; Stylianides, 2009; Thompson et al., 2012). Second, we have 
used the necessity principle to guide the development of a refined 
framework for textbook analysis that takes into account the types of 
mathematical statements within reasoning-and-proving opportuni-
ties. Future research may use this refined framework to investigate 
the reasoning-and-proving opportunities in content areas other than 
geometry or in contexts other than the United States. We have also 
identified apparent consonances between our findings and existing 
research on students’ performance and conceptions with respect to 
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reasoning-and-proving, but research focused on the links between 
reasoning-and-proving opportunities in curriculum materials and the 
reasoning-and-proving activities of the enacted and attained curricu-
lum is required to empirically confirm these connections. 
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